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ABSTRACT 
From the second post-war, a significant amount of resources have been used to 
support Italian industrial policy. Several studies has been developed in order to 
evaluate these types of interventions, but less efforts have been devoted to 
understand what were the real needs of Italian firms. The main aim of this paper is to 
analyze the demand of public subsides describing the experience of the Italian firms 
with regard to a complex structure of public interventions actually supplied by both 
central and local government. This type of demand is related to both the financial 
benefits led by the public grants and the firms’ needs produced by the potential new 
investments. A deep understanding of these mechanisms could improve the 
efficiency of the public sector policy design favouring the development of coherent 
and adequate program of grants with respect to the complex scenario in which 
Italian firms operate. Qualitative information and data were gathered trough 
interviews with managers of about 5400 firms. Logit techniques are developed in 
order to describe and quantify this demand. The main results are: firstly, it is 
difficult to outline a general demand framework in which all firms can be collocate 
independently by their specific characteristics: secondly, a significance and well-
clear demand seems to stand out form those firms which represent the more 
innovative and dynamic sectors of the Italian economic system; finally, a more 
general and traditional view of the industrial policy related to the development of 
physic infrastructures  is not such appreciated by the firms, mainly because of a lack 
of trust on the effective efficiency of these types of interventions. 
JEL: L5, H32 
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Introduction 
An area of the economic policy appears negative and distorting for anyone who has an 
economic studies’ background: it is that one that tries to take part directly on the agents’ 
behaviour in order to influence and to modify directly their choices.  
This is the field of action of the industrial policy and it is common to register a negative 
bias that is widespread in the political and journalistic position, beyond international 
institutions. Nevertheless industrial policy is quite widespread in every country, USA 
included. 
From a scientific point of view the empirical evidences that would prove the failure of 
industrial policies are weak and anecdotic news perhaps would not quickly be accepted as 
common sense in the debate if they were not coherent with a dominant opinion.  
Still weaker seem to be the analyses that prove the distortions to the competition derived 
from industrial policies’ interventions (at least general interventions oriented to SME)1. 
In a specular way  a positive bias is characteristic of other policies partially related: those 
for the support to the innovation and the research.  Public supports are considered desirable 
from all, surely with solid reasons and sturdier theoretical support, but strong empirical 
evidences about the positive effects of the subsidies are still missing.  
The present paper is based on a systematic and wide-ranging job that is carried out annually 
for Italy from the work group of the MET, a private centre of specialized research
2
. 
The report, from over 5 years, introduces an analytical summary of the effective dimension 
of regional flows of public policy also through financial transformations in order to 
compare the values (i.e. capital Grant and ESL calculated for loans and other form of low 
cost money to enterprises).  
In the last two years the job has been enriched with a large field survey (more then 5400 
interview) on a representative champion of the Italian enterprises in order to provide to 
meaningful picture of the regional situation for enterprises in the manufacturing, industrial 
and related services activities
3
. 
                                                 
1
 Cfr Lenihan (2004), Brancati (2007) 
2 www.met-economia.it  
3  The several editions of Rapporto MET have a general section and a sectoral analysis that vary from year 
to year: cfr. Rapporto MET, R. Brancati, Donzelli, Rome several years. Some of the more important 
analysis have regarded: Research and Innovation (2003-04), Policy for internationalization (2005), Policy 
for feminine entrepreneurship (2001), New enterprises and academics spin-off (2001), The guidelines of 
European politics (2001), Private equity (2001). 
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The analytical structure that inspires the present job and the whole report follow a simple  
logical framework.  
The industrial policy is considered, as many other public policy contexts, as a situation in 
which we can recognize a sort of pseudomarkets: public supply from the various 
administrations is confronted with firm’s demand.  
The price that regulates the matching  between demand and supply (in truth, the supply is 
inelastic and is defined from the allocation of public budget, or better from the available 
cash) is given from the advantage for the firms induced by public policy.  
The policy maker tries (or would have to try) to articulate this pseudomarket according to 
various objectives that have their own hierarchy.  
The governments should known the needs of the enterprises and sketch out a coherent 
intervention on the quantitative level (that is a plan that considers the quantity of interested 
enterprises and resources adapted to the aim and the kind of intervention) and qualitative 
(technical form, modality, administrative costs): they must  adapt the supply to the demand 
still remaining in the field of proper objectives of industrial policy. Policy makers select 
relevant objectives and in this area trying to follow firms’ needs and characteristics.  
The supply is fixed from the policy maker, but its real characterization depends closely - 
therefore - on administrative measure, on the conditions of access, and on the technical 
form of the "contract" (for example, the typology of admitted expenses, the relationship 
between the various aids, the services accessories, the guarantees, and so on).  
Like in the case of the supply for the self markets, there are various subjects that supply 
"policy" partially substitute: national and regional administrations put into practice a lot of 
facilities so there is a kind of competition between instruments, so the demand tends 
towards one or the other facility based on the convenience and the expendable funds.  
For many policies there is also a problem of identification: once recorded some level of 
expense associated to a specific public action, it isn’t clear if that level depends on a 
shortage of the potential demand, on an inadequate convenience in order to use all the 
resources allocated from the public budget, or on the real availabilities of cash that blocks 
the administration.  
The logical structure described is useful, the consequences for the policy maker and the 
analyst are that indistinct industrial policy does not have to be considered, but rather 
support that, in the given market conditions, could reduce ties to the growth or the 
realization of fixed capital. 
In the first place, it is necessary to finalize the policy in favour of those requirements of the  
enterprises that coincide with collective interests.  
A part from the regional differentiation, three general object seem to emerge: the support to 
the innovation and the scientific and technological research, the structural and dimensional 
strengthening of enterprises and the reduction of the environmental impact.  
The allocation of the funds should be tied to relevance of the objective weighted by the 
performance expected.  
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Therefore it could be appropriate not only to reserve space and resources for an important 
part of political RTDI (support for our productive system that needs actions for the 
technological advance and the transformation, and needs the availability on the territory of 
technological platforms), but also to dedicate to them adequate professional abilities.  
The actual allocation of funds for industrial policy doesn’t seem  to be related to such an 
orientation (cfr. Rapporto MET) with the wide majority of resources dedicated to general 
objectives with only 20% devoted to RTDI. 
Beyond the implementation of the research and the introduction of innovations, two 
objectives seem particularly important in the Italian case: the dimensional growth and the 
structural consolidation of the enterprises, on one side, and the reduction of environmental 
impact, from the other.  
Not only the funds for those objects are few, but the technical structure of the instruments 
that seem privileged in the actually industrial politics, is such to represent a deterrent if 
compared to the other measures of industrial policy.  
The devil is in the details: the procedural and access aspects are more important than  the 
general objectives reported in the laws. It is indispensable that the plan, coherent with 
objectives, takes care itself of such apparently smaller aspects. 
The present contribution focuses on an original analysis of the demand of industrial policy 
from the enterprises. The survey we already mentioned has been used in order to extract 
information for direct evaluations and for a quantitative estimation.  
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Some stylized fact 
 
Before analyzing the empirical model for the demand side, can be useful to develop a rapid 
outline of the Italian industrial policy4 at least in a quantitative way and to show the main 
results of our survey. 
The reconstruction of flows is particularly difficult in a country characterized by a strong 
interregional disequilibrium and by very complex institutional structure. We focus on the 
effective industrial policy, that is public resources that are really paid to the firms benefited 
by the programs: the figures of the expenditures to the firms are usually quite different from 
that from the public budget documents and it is necessary, for an independent analysis, to 
collect data from each relevant administration that has the final relationship with the 
enterprises. 
Source: Rapporto MET 2007 
 
In fig 1 it is clearly shown the strong downgrading of Italian industrial policy in its 
relevance for the general public expenditures and for the firms. 
 
                                                 
4
 It is very important to note that the technical debate on the effectiveness od structural policies in Italy has a 
long tradition mainly joint to the Mezzogiorno policies 
 Fig.1  "Equivalent" grants in Italy, (mln Ū, constant price, 2000)
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Between 2002 and 2006 industrial policy, in monetary terms, decreased deeply (-39,5%), 
but the historical shortcomings remained unchanged: lack of strategy, uncertainty of 
resources, too many instruments without well defined goals, weak governance with too 
many actors: regions, local governments and national administration. 
 
 
 
Source: Rapporto MET 2007 
 
 
An aggregate picture of the preferences of the governments can be derived from Fig 2 that 
divides the global flows by objective: it’s easy to note that the majority of resources are 
devoted to the main objectives –two- and that the structure of funds’ allocation is quite 
stable over the years. The “general” measures, mainly oriented to the simple accumulation 
process of the firms (in a particular way to the so called depressed regions), register more 
or less 60% of the total, while only 20% is directed to sustain RTDI. Other aims, beside 
their importance, receive only minor shares. In some regions the same objectives can 
receive so few money that becomes questionable the opportunity to allocate resources not 
coherent with the dimension of the problem they want to cope for. 
Crisis General RTDI  Credit Access Consolidation
 Local 
Development
Specialized 
services Early Stage Internat.
Italia, 2006 2,0% 57,2% 19,9% 1,2% 0,7% 5,2% 2,3% 7,8% 3,7%
Italia, 2005 2,3% 58,9% 20,5% 0,8% 1,0% 6,6% 1,5% 5,1% 3,3%
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Fig 2 - Industrial policy in Italy, 2006, expenditures by objective, %
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The aggregate picture has, as argued in the introduction, two sides: the supply and the 
demand. The supply side, at least in Italy, is analysed trough the examination of the specific 
–over 250- measures and laws, with the relevant resources allocated in the public budget. 
The demand side for industrial policy must represent the firms’ needs that are not 
adequately fulfilled by the market: it is very complex to evaluate this aspect and we tried to 
develop an insight through a wide survey (5400) limited to manufacturing activities and 
services to the enterprises. 
The sample was stratified according to three criteria: region (20), sector (4), dimension (4 
groups). 
The questionnaire was divided in sections: market and competitive advantages, structural 
aspects of production, innovation and investments, development constraints, demand for 
policies (mainly through indirect demands). For the same survey firms were associated the 
balance sheets with a complete picture of the financial and real data. 
Before presenting some estimation in the following section, here we can illustrate same 
evidence referred to few specific questions that can give a sketch of the structure. 
It is worth noting that at least 1/3 of the Italian firms are not to be considered at all as a 
target of industrial policy. The 36,5% of the sample is quite static in his behaviour: the 
characteristic of this group is given by no innovation, no investments and no growth of 
turnover. The same group is not homogenous for the contemporary presence of marginal 
firms with crisis’ indicators associated with other firms that register high profitability also 
in a not-dynamic situation (probably related to the exploitation of niche or captive markets), 
but the conclusion in an industrial policy scheme should be the same.  
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The general attitude towards local development policy is widely positive. We have to 
consider, nonetheless, that the same picture is rapidly worsening from 2006 to 20075. 
The last year the same question registered over 20% more positive answers: one possible 
reason is the increasing lack of confidence of agents in presence of massive programs of 
local development that never become real actions. This is the case of southern regions 
where the worsening is stronger. 
Other answers put in evidence the complexity of this kind of policy with firms’ needs 
strongly associated to the development of a real project. 
The consciousness of the problems and constraints for the firms’ development seems 
widespread: the main problems are focused in the market functions, while technical and 
managerial constraints are identified by one third of the interviews. It is worth noting that 
the financial area is signalled by only 23,5% of the total firms. 
 
                                                 
5
 We have to note that our survey is based on a panel methodology that allows some intertemporal 
comparison. 
Do you consider as useful a specific policy for local development?  
Si
55,7%
No
44,3%
Si No
% riga % riga
PIE 52,20% 47,80%
VDA 29,60% 70,40%
LOM 55,90% 44,10%
TRE 41,60% 58,40%
VEN 61,30% 38,70%
FVG 56,30% 43,70%
LIG 50,90% 49,10%
EMR 47,70% 52,30%
TOS 54,10% 45,90%
UMB 56,30% 43,70%
MAR 60,60% 39,40%
LAZ 54,90% 45,10%
ABR 60,80% 39,20%
MOL 69,60% 30,40%
CAM 51,40% 48,60%
PUG 53,70% 46,30%
BAS 73,00% 27,00%
CAL 57,30% 42,70%
SIC 69,50% 30,50%
SAR 68,80% 31,20%
Totale 55,70% 44,30%
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Can you indicate your main weakness?  
 
39,6%
45,8%
0,0%
36,8%
23,5%
Altro
Finanziario
Manageriale
Tecnico
Mercato
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Can you underline the infrastructures with a stronger impact on your own economic 
perspective?  
 
37,4%
9,6%
9,6%
2,6%
7,6%
7,3%
12,7%
18,2%
10,7%
Altro
Laboratori e centri di ricerca
Reti elettriche, reti idriche
Aree industriali
Opere di urbanizzazione
Centri di servizi specialistici
Servizi ferroviari, piattaforme logistiche
Reti informatiche (wireless o altro)
Strade e reti ferroviarie
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One of the most relevant section of the questionnaire is devoted directly to the industrial 
policy asking the effective access to policy measures. 
You can find the answers in the following pictures and the main results can be quickly 
summarized: 
At least 22% of Italian firms receive public support, if we consider that there is a 
substantial bias towards an underestimate of public role (a check for one southern region on 
the administrative data give a share of 47% instead of 28% of the survey). 
• The deadweight is substantial, but not so high, if compared to other analysis of the 
same nature; the acceptable level of deadweight depends on a number of factors 
considering also the fiscal flows of the new activities (cfr. Met Report 2006). 
• The general mood of the firms towards industrial policy is not so negative as 
reported by newspapers and analysts: 43,1% of the enterprises have a negative 
judgement of the interventions. The displacement is considered possible only by 
less than 5% of the total and other aspects are indicated by less than 4%. This share 
are not so different between firms that benefited of the subsidies and the others. 
• There is still an area for industrial policy. A general picture can be derived from the 
presence of potentially profitable investments that the firms didn’t realize for lack of 
money: over 6% of the firms signal this aspect as influent. 
 
 
 
Did you receive any public aid in the last three years?  
No
77,1%
Si
22,9%
21,1%
58,1%
4,2%
11,3%
5,4%
Oltre 3
Non specifica
Tre
Due
Una
Se sì, 
Quante volte ?  
Base 1224 
rispondenti, % 
calcolate al 
netto dei “no” 
_pag.13_ 
 
 
 
 
 
If your judgement on Industrial policy measures is negative (43,1% of interviews), which 
is the reason for? 
 
11,5%
24,6%
3,9%
7,9%
3,5%
11,4%
8,7%
Vi sono disto rsioni nelle scelte di
investimento delle imprese che rischiano di
peggio rare i risultati
Introducono distorsioni nei rapporti con i
fo rnito ri di beni di investimento
Portano a un maggio r livello  di
indebitamento complessivo
I rapporti con la P.A. e gli oneri conseguenti
determinano aggravi di costi tali da rendere
molto basso  il reale beneficio  per l'impresa
Costringono a realizzare tutti gli investimenti
insieme senza gratuità
Creano situazioni di concorrenza sleale tra
imprese
Scarsa trasparenza
Did you have investment programs that you miss for lack of resources ? 
No; 86,1%
Si; 13,9%
50,8%
9,4%
26,0%
15,7%
Spazi insufficienti
Risorse umane
Autorizzazioni
Risorse
finanziarie
Se si, 
Per quale 
motivo? (d52) 
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Some Empirical Evidence 
 
The aim of the empirical model is to estimate the determinants of the industrial policy 
demand of the firms. In particular, it has been attempted to analyze which are the features 
of the enterprises that ask a policy support and which are the factors that differentiate this 
last from the others that do not seem to be interested to the public support. The data used 
are obtained merging the result of the survey with the information on the balance sheets 
dataset. 
The questionnaire in the survey is very articulate and covered a host of topics. The survey 
is carried out in the first months of 2007, over a representative sample of 5350. However, 
we have only 2869 for which are available balance sheets from AIDA dataset. We take into 
account three fundamental aspects of the industrial policy: those concerning a general 
demand of local economic development programs, those relative to the physical 
infrastructure demand, and finally, those associated with a general support for the 
innovation and R&D activities of the firms.  Many question in the questionnaire concerning 
public incentives are judgmental, then we try to use opinion information in order to 
evaluate the demand of different type of intervention programs formulated by the firms. In 
particular, we focused on two specific questions: (i) “Do you consider useful for your firm 
a general policy for the local development?” and (ii)“Which policy do you think will be 
better in order to improve the performance of your firm?”. 
The first question allows for a dichotomous answer, while the second has different options 
which can be chosen by the interviewed. Then the answers to the first question give us a 
general figure of how much the firms consider useful a policy design focused on the local 
development. Several reasons can induce the interviewed to answer positively to this issue. 
If there does not exist deep lack of confidence about the State aid, we expect that the results 
are a good proxy of the demand … 
The possible answers to the second question are instead more articulated, but this leads to a 
bigger variety of useful information. Then, we followed this line of reasoning: we organize 
the different options into two homogenous sub-sets in which we merge the answers 
belonging to the same general policy trend. In table 1 are described the three dependent 
variables used and the associated questions extract from the survey. With respect to the last 
two variables, therefore, we have chosen to identify two groups of answers. The first one 
collects all the positive opinion regarding material and immaterial good and services 
potentially provided by the public authorities closer to the technological and innovative 
activities of the firms. While the second one collects all the firms’ needs mainly in terms of 
physical infrastructures. 
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Through this transformation we have binary variables which can be used to estimate a logit 
model in which the coefficients associated to the independent variables measure the impact 
of each regressor on the probability that the firm has a demand of the respective policy 
described by the dependent variable. The estimated logit model is expressed by the (1): 
)X(
e
e)y(prob X
X
β′Λ=
+
== β′
β′
1
1 ,                                                                                  (1) 
where Λ  is the well-known notation for the logistic distribution and the X matrix contains 
explanatory variables. The determining variables6 includes in the equation (1) are the 
following. Turnover and ratio between total immobilization and turnover as proxy of the 
firm size and dynamism. The amount of resources employed in R&D and the share of sales 
exported.  
Furthermore, we introduce dummies variables constructed using the information of the 
survey. In particular, three variables described the weakness of the firms. We have asked to 
the firms which is the main weakness of their activity. There were three possible options: 
managerial, technical and market weaknesses. Thus, we constructed three different 
variables that assume value 1 if the respective weakness has been indicated by the 
interviewed, 0 otherwise. We used the results derived form other two questions in the 
survey: (i) Do the purchases in your localization area important for your business?”; “have 
you never thought to move your production activity abroad?”. These take value 1 if the firm 
                                                 
6
 All the continuous variables contained in equation (1) are expressed in natural logarithms. 
Table 1.Dependent variables 
Local 
Development 
Do you consider useful for your 
firm a general policy for the local 
development 
1 if the answer is "yes".
0 otherwise.



 
51.8% 1;
48.2% 0.
→

→
 
Innovation 
and Human 
capital 
formation 
support 
1 if the naswer is: support for human capital formation 
   or support for specialized and technologial services;
0 otherwise.





 
35.6% 1;
64.4% 0.
→

→
 
Physical 
infrastructure 
Which policy do you think will be 
better in order to improve the 
performance of your firm? 
1 if there answer is: roads or railways (services and networks) 
    or electric system or water system ;
0 otherwise.





 
60.1% 1;
39.9% 0.
→

→
 
Note: Number of observations is equal to 2869 
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has answered “yes”, 0 otherwise. Finally, we control for the other two policy demand 
variables not used as dependent and for the south Italy. 
 
 
In Table 2 the main results of the logit model (1) are shown. 
Tabella 2. Firms’ policy demand 
Dep. variable Local development demand Inn. and Human cap. Physical capital demand 
 [a] [b] [a] [b] [a] [b] 
ln(turnover) -2.217*** -0.322 -1.841*** -0.454 0.401 0.088 
ln(imm./turnover) 0.028** 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.019 0.004 
managerial weakness 0.415*** -0.052 0.157* 0.038 0.132* 0.030 
technical weakness -0.017 -0.002 0.255*** 0.062 0.077 0.017 
market weakness 0.039 -0.005 0.105 0.026 0.192** 0.043 
resources in R&D -0.056  0.425*** 0.101 -0.099 -0.021 
purchases form the 
same localization area. 
0.354*** 0.057 0.110 0.027 0.238*** 0.054 
move the production 
abroad 
0.623*** 0.109 -0.028 -0.007 0.093 0.093 
export 0.237*  0.216* 0.052 0.341*** 0.079 
human capital demand 0.806*** 0.147 . . -0.639*** -0.122 
physical capital 
demand 
0.876*** 0.163 -0.638*** -0.158 .  
south -0.015 -0.002 -0.156 -0.038 0.257** 0.059 
Number of obs. 2869  2869  2869  
LR χ2 285.55***  120.89***  106.3***  
Note.: *, ** and *** denote 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance, respectively. 
 
The χ2 statistics for the joint impact of the explanatory variables allow us to conclude the 
dependent variables are jointly significant in all the models. 
The first specification takes into account a general demand of local development support. 
The results suggest that more the firm is big (i.e. with a high turnover) and less it is the 
probability of this firm needs this type of policy. However, the coefficient associated with 
the ratio between immobilization and turnover is positive, then we expect the investment 
programs have a positive impact on the demand of local development. Managerial and 
market weaknesses have opposite signs. The first affects positively the demand, while the 
latter negatively. If the purchases in the local market are very important for the firm then its  
demand of local development programs will be higher.  
The coefficients associated with the demand of support for “innovation and human capital 
formation activities” and physical infrastructure are both significant even if the latter seems 
to be bigger. Finally, there is no evidence that the localization in the Southern Italy is a 
significant determinant of the demand of local development. 
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The second specification underlines the determinants of the demand of a policy which 
supports the innovation and human capital formation activities of the firms. The results 
indicate the small firms with managerial, technical and market weaknesses seem to be more 
interested into this type of programs. Furthermore, the higher is the share of sales exported 
and bigger is the demand of this policy, while this is negatively correlated with the demand 
of physical infrastructure. As we expected, the total amount of resources devoted for the 
R&D activities has a positive impact on the demand of this policy. The regional control is 
basically not significant, showing how this type of demand does not assume any specific 
feature of localization. 
The last specification describes the determinants of the physical infrastructure demand. The 
results show how difficult is to identify a clear model for this type of needs. In general, it is 
possible to suppose that this demand is associated with a very heterogeneous class of agents 
and does not exist a specific group of economic variable able to describe its structure. 
However, estimated coefficients indicates, as we expected, the exporting firms have an 
higher need of physical infrastructure and that the demand of these policy is bigger in the 
South. 
Conclusion 
 
Public policies decreases deeply in the last years. 
The policy makers needs to know which are the needs of the firms in order to optimize its 
policy design and the allocated resources. 
Empirical results of the logit model estimated. Small firms with several weaknesses have an 
high demand of local development and Innovation and human capital formation policies. 
The firms which demand the latter are usually very dynamic, exporting, with an 
considerable amunt of resources devoted in R&D. 
The demand general policy of implementation of physical infrastructure is presence 
expecially in the south and for the firms which declare to have market weaknesses. 
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